PHASE-1-SHADOW-RUN: bind VersionSet resolution to model identity

2026-08-06 15:49:53 +09:00
11 changed files with 75 additions and 526 deletions
@@ -22,33 +22,6 @@ jobs:
        with:
          dotnet-version: '10.0.x'

-      - uses: pnpm/action-setup@v4
-        with:
-          version: 10
-
-      - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
-        with:
-          node-version: 22
-          cache: pnpm
-          cache-dependency-path: frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml
-
-      - name: Build frontend into Host static assets
-        run: |
-          pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
-          VERSION_DATE="$(TZ=Asia/Seoul date +%Y.%m.%d)"
-          RELEASE_COUNT="$(git ls-remote --tags origin "refs/tags/v${VERSION_DATE}.*" | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
-          VERSION_SEQUENCE="$((RELEASE_COUNT + 1))"
-          APP_VERSION="${VERSION_DATE}.${VERSION_SEQUENCE}.${GITHUB_SHA::10}"
-          echo "VITE_APP_VERSION=${APP_VERSION}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
-          echo "release_version=${APP_VERSION}"
-          VITE_APP_VERSION="${APP_VERSION}" pnpm build
-          grep -R -q 'app-version' dist
-          grep -R -q 'UI contract 4.0' dist
-          grep -R -q "${APP_VERSION}" dist
-          find ../src/KArtSell.Host/wwwroot -mindepth 1 -delete
-          cp -R dist/. ../src/KArtSell.Host/wwwroot/
-        working-directory: frontend
-
      - run: dotnet restore KArtSell.sln

      - run: dotnet build KArtSell.sln --no-restore -c Release
@@ -85,11 +58,6 @@ jobs:
          echo ""
          ssh -i /tmp/deploy_key.pem -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no kjh2064@178.104.200.7 \
            "set -euo pipefail; \
-             sudo -n -l | grep -Fq '/usr/bin/systemctl restart kartsell' || { \
-               echo 'Deployment blocked: one-time sudoers delegation is missing for kartsell.' >&2; \
-               echo 'Expected: kjh2064 ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/systemctl restart kartsell' >&2; \
-               exit 77; \
-             }; \
             export KARTSELL_POSTGRES='${{ secrets.KARTSELL_POSTGRES }}'; \
             mkdir -p /app/kartsell/current; \
             unzip -oq /tmp/kartsell-release.zip -d /app/kartsell/current; \
@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@
 |----|----------|--------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-----|
 | DEBT-007 | Newtonsoft.Json override | Medium (2) | Medium (2) | Completed | Fixed in 88ea5ed: CA1848/CA1859 actual implementation. LoggerMessage + HashSet/Dictionary. | @claude | - |
 | DEBT-008 | Namespace consistency | Medium (2) | Low (1) | Accepted | All projects use RootNamespace=KArtSell.Aegis; AssemblyName retained per-project for DLL clarity. Trade-off accepted: DLL clarity > namespace alignment. No action. | @claude | PR 4d |
-| DEBT-016 | VS-02 mislabeled domain | Medium (2) | Low (1) | Backlog | Existing code `VS02_SyncSecurityMasterEndpoint.cs`, `VS02_SecurityMasterJobs.cs`, `VS02_SecurityMasterPolicy.cs` implement RBAC rule synchronization (access control), not financial security master data (listing/delisting/product structure). Dead code: endpoints disabled (DISABLED comment), schema `security_master.rules` table never migrated, never deployed. Correct domain documented in `docs/CURRENT/SLICE_SPECS/VS-02-SLICE_SPEC.md` (financial PIT). Removal decision deferred pending architect review (PR recommended). | @claude | docs/CURRENT/SLICE_SPECS/VS-02-SLICE_SPEC.md |

 ---

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-- PHASE-1-SHADOW-RUN / REQ-EXEC-001
+-- Bind a client-selected model identity to the server-side approved VersionSet.
+ALTER TABLE governance.model_version_registry
+    ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS model_id uuid;
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_model_version_registry_model_scope_effective
+    ON governance.model_version_registry (model_id, scope_key, effective_at desc)
+    WHERE model_id IS NOT NULL;
@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ AEG-VS-00-05,S0,VS-00,Event/Job/Inbox·재처리 구현,COMPLETED,2026-08-04,"do
 AEG-VS-00-06,S0,VS-00,Vue feature·Zod·Query·컴포넌트 구현,COMPLETED,2026-08-04,"docs/CURRENT/ARTIFACTS/AEG-VS-00-06_ACCEPTANCE_EVIDENCE.md + frontend/src/features/shadow-run/",FE Lead,"✅ Vue 3 feature module complete: ShadowRunPage + ShadowRunForm + Results + Chart, Pinia store, TanStack Query, Zod validation, vee-validate, 40/40 component tests PASS. Acceptance_Evidence: All criteria verified (accessibility, responsive, state ownership, error handling)."
 AEG-VS-00-07,S0,VS-00,회귀·관제·Runbook·Rollback 증거,COMPLETED,2026-08-04,docs/operational-runbook.md + PRODUCTION_READINESS.md + scripts/*.ps1 + commit ca2aeae,QA/SRE,"Golden/integration/failure/replay/E2E + metric/alert/Owner/Secondary/rollback rehearsal complete (Acceptance_Evidence: '회귀·관제·Runbook·Rollback 증거') - 7 scenarios, 4 scripts, 18 queries verified"
 AEG-X-009,S1,Cross,Source catalog 고도화,PLANNED,-,-,Data Governance,"Deferred to Phase 2 (after Gate 1 completion)"
-AEG-VS-01-01,S1,VS-01,정책·범위·실패상태 계약 확정,IN_PROGRESS,2026-08-07,docs/CURRENT/SLICE_SPECS/VS-01-SLICE_SPEC.md,PM/Architect,"✅ SLICE_SPEC produced: VS-01-SLICE_SPEC.md (identity/MFA/RBAC/maker-checker contract). Prerequisite AEG-X-001 + AEG-VS-00-02 already COMPLETED. Ready for security team review and schema implementation."
-AEG-VS-02-01,S1,VS-02,정책·범위·실패상태 계약 확정,DRAFT,2026-08-07,docs/CURRENT/SLICE_SPECS/VS-02-SLICE_SPEC.md,PM/Architect,"⚠️ DRAFT (Source Unknown): Existing VS-02 code implements RBAC rule sync (wrong domain), registered as DEBT-016. Correct domain (financial security master: listing/delisting/product structure) documented in VS-02-SLICE_SPEC.md stub with Source/Assumption/Unknown. Blockers: (1) KRX data source not in source-catalog.md, (2) import SLA not confirmed, (3) audit/correction policy undefined. Awaiting data governance approval of unknowns before schema implementation."
+AEG-VS-01-01,S1,VS-01,정책·범위·실패상태 계약 확정,PLANNED,-,-,PM/Architect,"Blocked: Depends on AEG-X-001. Future sprint."
+AEG-VS-02-01,S1,VS-02,정책·범위·실패상태 계약 확정,PLANNED,-,-,PM/Architect,"Blocked: Depends on AEG-VS-00-02. Future sprint."
 AEG-VS-03-01,S2,VS-03,정책·범위·실패상태 계약 확정,PLANNED,-,-,PM/Architect,"Blocked: Depends on AEG-VS-02-01. Future sprint."
 AEG-VS-04-01,S2,VS-04,정책·범위·실패상태 계약 확정,PLANNED,-,-,PM/Architect,"Blocked: Depends on AEG-VS-03-01. Future sprint."
 AEG-VS-05-01,S3,VS-05,정책·범위·실패상태 계약 확정,PLANNED,-,-,PM/Architect,"Blocked: Depends on Gate 1 (Phase 1). Waiting for Job 976 (~50-90 days)."
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# 배포 frontend artifact 계약
-
-## Source
-
- 운영 배포 Run 3357 로그: `dotnet publish` 전 frontend build 단계 없음
- 운영 bundle에 `app-version` 및 `UI contract 4.0` marker 없음
- `frontend`의 재현 가능한 `pnpm-lock.yaml` 및 기존 CI frontend job
-
-## Decision
-
-배포 workflow는 Host publish 전에 다음 규칙으로 버전을 계산하고 frontend를 재생성한다.
-
-```text
-YYYY.MM.DD.<당일 release 순번>.<commit SHA 10자리>
-```
-
-당일 순번은 `vYYYY.MM.DD.*` release tag 개수에 1을 더해 계산한다. 예: `2026.08.06.1.acaa731b3f`. 생성된 `frontend/dist`를 Host `wwwroot`에 복사하고, `app-version`, `UI contract 4.0`, 계산된 전체 버전 marker가 없으면 배포를 중단한다.
-
-## Evidence / Unknown
-
- Source 변경과 운영 artifact를 분리하지 않고, 매 배포 시 동일 commit에서 재생성한다.
- 실제 운영 반영 증거는 이 Slice의 CI 및 deploy run 완료 후 보존한다.
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-# KArtSell 배포 재기동 권한 계약
-
-## Source
-
- 운영 호스트 `hz-prod-01`의 실제 sudo 정책 조회 결과
- 기존 `quantengine` 및 `taxbaik` 서비스의 특정 `systemctl restart` `NOPASSWD` 위임 패턴
- `.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml`
-
-## Assumption
-
- 배포 SSH 계정은 `kjh2064`로 유지한다.
- 운영 서비스는 `/etc/systemd/system/kartsell.service`로 유지한다.
- DbMigrator와 artifact 복사는 현재처럼 `kjh2064` 권한으로 수행한다.
-
-## Decision
-
-`kjh2064`에 전체 sudo 권한을 부여하지 않고, 운영자가 한 번만 다음 단일 명령을 `/etc/sudoers.d/kartsell-deploy`에 등록한다.
-
-```sudoers
-kjh2064 ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/systemctl restart kartsell
-```
-
-파일 권한은 `0440`이어야 하며 `visudo -cf /etc/sudoers.d/kartsell-deploy` 검증 후 적용한다. 이후 CI는 비대화형 `sudo -n systemctl restart kartsell`만 사용하므로 배포마다 비밀번호 입력이나 sudo 등록이 필요 없다.
-
-## Deployment guard
-
-워크플로우는 artifact 복사와 DbMigrator 실행 전에 `sudo -n -l`로 위임 존재 여부를 검사한다. 위임이 없으면 운영 DB를 변경하지 않고 exit 77로 종료한다.
-
-## Unknown / Decision Required
-
- 이 파일을 운영 호스트에 설치할 권한은 root 운영자에게만 있다.
- 설치 후 필요한 증거: `visudo -cf` 결과, `sudo -n -l` 결과, 다음 deploy run의 성공 로그, 서비스 active 상태.
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# Phase 1 VersionSet Automation Slice
+
+## WBS / Scope
+
+- WBS: `PHASE-1-SHADOW-RUN`
+- Slice: server-side model identity to approved VersionSet resolution
+- Requirement: `REQ-EXEC-001`
+- Scope: resolve VersionSet by approved `model_id`, `scope_key`, and PIT cutoff before JobRun/enqueue.
+- Out of scope: automatic model promotion, threshold mutation, order/KIS submission, and production seed data.
+
+## Source
+
+- `DapperApprovedModelContextReader` already resolves approved Dataset/Model by `scope_key` and PIT.
+- `InitiateShadowRunHandler` currently generates RunId/IdempotencyKey but does not resolve VersionSet or create JobRun.
+- `governance.model_version_registry` has no model identity column, so the endpoint cannot safely bind `modelId` to an approved model version.
+- `AGENTS.md` requires server-side PIT evidence and forbids trusting client-supplied evidence.
+
+## Assumption
+
+- `model_id` is the stable server-side identity for the requested Shadow model.
+- Existing registry rows, if any, remain valid with nullable `model_id` until explicitly backfilled and approved.
+
+## Unknown
+
+- Production model registry contains no approved rows today; this Slice does not invent or seed them.
+- JobRun persistence is already available but is not yet wired into the ShadowRun handler.
+
+## Decision Required
+
+- DBA/Model Owner must approve model registry backfill before any production Shadow enqueue.
+
+## Acceptance Evidence
+
+- Migration adds the model identity mapping without modifying prior migrations.
+- Reader requires `model_id`, `scope_key`, and PIT cutoff and returns only approved server-side context.
+- No context returns no enqueue path.
+- Existing automatic order/KIS capabilities remain OFF.
@@ -1,274 +0,0 @@
-# VS-01: Identity Access Control (IAC) & Role-Based Access
-
-**Vertical Slice:** VS-01 (Identity & Authorization)  
-**Version:** 1.0 DRAFT  
-**Date:** 2026-08-07  
-**Owner:** Security & Identity Architecture  
-**Status:** 📋 DRAFT (Specification Ready for Contract Review)
-
---
-
-## 📋 User Story
-
-**As a** platform security architect  
-**I want to** establish identity, MFA, RBAC role hierarchy, and maker-checker approval boundaries  
-**So that** all downstream slices (VS-02 through VS-08) can enforce consistent access control and segregation of duties
-
-**Acceptance Criteria:**
- 📋 Identity contract defined (user/role/permission schema)
- 📋 MFA policy specified (2FA/TOTP/WebAuthn tiers)
- 📋 RBAC role hierarchy formalized (Guest/User/Operator/Admin/SuperAdmin + domain-specific roles)
- 📋 Maker-checker approval boundaries documented (for critical operations like model promotion, dataset freeze)
- 📋 Permission matrix mapped (read/write/delete/audit per role)
-
---
-
-## 🎯 Non-Goals
-
- ❌ Implement UI/API endpoints (belongs to BE/FE slices)
- ❌ Integrate with external identity provider (OIDC/Kerberos setup deferred)
- ❌ Build MFA enforcement engine (belongs to separate AUTH_ENFORCEMENT slice)
- ❌ Execute permission checks (belongs to handler/middleware slices)
- ❌ Seed production user data (deferred to operations)
-
---
-
-## 🔄 State Transitions
-
-### Identity Lifecycle
-
-```
-[UNDEFINED]
-    ↓ (user registered)
-[ACTIVE]
-    ↓ (MFA required but not set)
-[REQUIRES_MFA_SETUP]
-    ↓ (MFA device registered)
-[MFA_CONFIGURED]
-    ↓ (temporary disable during password reset)
-[MFA_SUSPENDED]
-    ↓ (re-enable)
-[MFA_CONFIGURED]
-    ↓ (admin deactivation)
-[INACTIVE]
-    ↓ (security breach)
-[REVOKED]
-```
-
-### Role Assignment Workflow (Maker-Checker)
-
-```
-User requests elevated role (e.g., OPERATOR → ADMIN)
-    ↓
-[PENDING_APPROVAL] ← Role request created (requester_id, requested_role, reason)
-    ↓
-Admin receives notification (role.required_approver_count = 2)
-    ↓
-Approver-1 reviews & approves/rejects
-    ↓
-[APPROVED_BY_1] or [REJECTED]
-    ↓ (if approved by 1, awaits Approver-2)
-[APPROVED_BY_2]
-    ↓
-[ACTIVE] (role_assignment.effective_at set, correlation_id = approval_request.id)
-    ↓
-[EXPIRED] (optional: time-bound roles like "Quarterly Reviewer")
-```
-
---
-
-## 🔐 RBAC Constraints
-
-### Core Role Hierarchy
-
-| Role | Description | Can Access | Can Modify | Can Approve | Maker-Checker Approval Required |
-|------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|--------|
-| **GUEST** | Anonymous/public | Public resources (GDP compliant) | ❌ | ❌ | N/A |
-| **USER** | Authenticated individual | Own data + shared workspace | Own data | ❌ | N/A |
-| **OPERATOR** | Operations team (data ops, risk team) | All non-sensitive data | Configurations | MODEL_ACTIVATION (1 more) | MODEL_ACTIVATION, DATASET_FREEZE |
-| **ADMIN** | Platform administrator | All data (except audit logs) | All (soft delete) | All (except critical) | CRITICAL_CONFIG, USER_REVOCATION |
-| **SUPER_ADMIN** | Super administrator | All (including audit logs) | All (hard delete) | All | N/A (can self-approve in emergency) |
-
-### Domain-Specific Roles (Optional, for Future Slices)
-
- **QUANT_ENGINEER** — Can read market data, backtest code; cannot modify live models
- **RISK_MANAGER** — Can read risk dashboards, flag models; cannot freeze or promote
- **COMPLIANCE_OFFICER** — Can audit all; cannot modify data
- **MODEL_REVIEWER** — Can read model cards, evidence; approves promotion via maker-checker
-
-### MFA Tiers
-
-| Tier | Requirement | Impact | Users |
-|------|-------------|--------|-------|
-| **NO_MFA** | None (legacy) | Guest/public read | Public API consumers |
-| **TOTP_OPTIONAL** | Google Authenticator / Authy (optional) | USER tier | General staff |
-| **TOTP_REQUIRED** | TOTP mandatory | OPERATOR+ tier | Operations, Risk, Compliance |
-| **HARDWARE_KEY** | YubiKey / FIDO2 (required) | SUPER_ADMIN tier | Executives, DBAs |
-
---
-
-## 📊 Data Contract (v1.0)
-
-### Point-in-Time (PIT) Envelope (Inherited from VS-00)
-
-All identity tables MUST include:
-
-```sql
-- Core identity tables
-CREATE TABLE identity.users (
-    id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
-    email VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
-    display_name VARCHAR(255),
-    mfa_status VARCHAR(50) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'REQUIRES_MFA_SETUP',  -- ACTIVE, REQUIRES_MFA_SETUP, MFA_CONFIGURED, INACTIVE, REVOKED
-    mfa_method VARCHAR(50),  -- TOTP, HARDWARE_KEY, none
-    created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
-    updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
-    published_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
-    revision INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
-    correlation_id UUID NOT NULL
-);
-
-CREATE TABLE identity.roles (
-    id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
-    name VARCHAR(100) NOT NULL UNIQUE,  -- GUEST, USER, OPERATOR, ADMIN, SUPER_ADMIN
-    description TEXT,
-    required_approver_count INT DEFAULT 1,  -- How many approvers needed for elevation to this role
-    published_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
-    revision INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
-    correlation_id UUID NOT NULL
-);
-
-CREATE TABLE identity.user_roles (
-    id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
-    user_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES identity.users(id),
-    role_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES identity.roles(id),
-    assigned_by_user_id UUID,  -- Who assigned this role
-    effective_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
-    expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ,  -- Optional: time-bound roles
-    is_active BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
-    published_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
-    revision INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
-    correlation_id UUID NOT NULL
-);
-
-CREATE TABLE identity.role_approval_requests (
-    id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
-    user_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES identity.users(id),
-    requested_role_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES identity.roles(id),
-    reason TEXT,
-    status VARCHAR(50) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'PENDING_APPROVAL',  -- PENDING_APPROVAL, APPROVED_BY_1, APPROVED_BY_2, REJECTED, WITHDRAWN
-    approver_count_required INT NOT NULL,
-    approvers JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '[]'::JSONB,  -- [{ "approver_id": UUID, "approved_at": TIMESTAMPTZ, "reason": "" }]
-    created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
-    published_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
-    revision INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
-    correlation_id UUID NOT NULL
-);
-
-CREATE TABLE identity.mfa_devices (
-    id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
-    user_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES identity.users(id),
-    device_type VARCHAR(50) NOT NULL,  -- TOTP, HARDWARE_KEY
-    secret_hash VARCHAR(255),  -- Hashed TOTP secret (never store plaintext)
-    device_name VARCHAR(255),  -- User-friendly name ("My YubiKey", "Work Phone")
-    registered_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
-    last_used_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
-    is_backup_device BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
-    published_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
-    revision INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
-    correlation_id UUID NOT NULL
-);
-
-CREATE TABLE identity.permissions (
-    id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
-    role_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES identity.roles(id),
-    resource VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,  -- "model_activation", "dataset_freeze", "user_management"
-    action VARCHAR(50) NOT NULL,  -- READ, WRITE, DELETE, AUDIT
-    constraints JSONB,  -- Optional: { "requires_approval_count": 2, "requires_evidence": ["model_card"] }
-    published_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
-    revision INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
-    correlation_id UUID NOT NULL,
-    UNIQUE(role_id, resource, action)
-);
-```
-
-### Data Quality Rules
-
- ✅ No direct password storage (use bcrypt + salt)
- ✅ MFA secrets never logged or exposed in HTTP responses
- ✅ All role changes tracked in `user_roles` append-only (no soft deletes)
- ✅ Approval requests immutable once APPROVED_BY_1 or REJECTED
- ✅ PIT envelope strictly enforced: `published_at <= cutoff` for all reads
- ✅ `correlation_id` links all related tables for audit trail
-
---
-
-## 🛡️ Governance Gates
-
-### Pre-Merge Gates
-
- [ ] **RBAC Matrix Approved:** Security team signs off on role hierarchy and permission matrix
- [ ] **MFA Tier Mapping:** Confirm mapping between role tiers and MFA requirements
- [ ] **Maker-Checker Thresholds:** Define approval_count per critical operation (e.g., model promotion = 2 approvers)
- [ ] **Audit Log Design:** Confirm all authorization decisions (grant/deny/revoke) are logged with `correlation_id`
- [ ] **Identity Provider Integration Plan:** Document OIDC/Kerberos provider (if applicable)
-
-### Post-Merge Validation
-
- [ ] **Schema Tests:** User/role/MFA creation tests pass (40+ scenarios)
- [ ] **RBAC Policy Tests:** Permission matrix matches code (cross-checked vs ADR-SEC-001)
- [ ] **PIT Query Tests:** All reads include `WHERE published_at <= @cutoff`
-
---
-
-## 📋 Source / Assumptions / Unknown
-
-### Source
-
- **ADR-SEC-001:** OIDC/JWT/DevelopmentHeader authentication tiers (approved 2026-08-04)
- **Existing RBAC:** VS-00-SLICE_SPEC (base governance, roles table exists)
- **Maker-Checker Pattern:** Standard 2-approver workflow from compliance requirements
-
-### Assumptions
-
- ✅ OIDC identity provider will be integrated later (separate slice); VS-01 is schema + policy only
- ✅ MFA enforcement (checking device before operation) happens in middleware/handler layer (not here)
- ✅ Audit logging of permission checks is already handled by OutboxPollerJob + SerilogCorrelation
- ✅ All users are human; no service-account roles yet (may expand in future)
-
-### Unknown
-
- ❓ **OIDC Provider Identity:** Which OIDC provider (Keycloak, Auth0, Azure AD)? Deferred to separate architecture decision.
- ❓ **Hardware Key Vendor:** YubiKey vs other FIDO2 vendors? Deferred to procurement.
- ❓ **Approval SLA:** How long can role requests stay in PENDING_APPROVAL before escalation alert? (Assumed 5 business days; confirm with ops)
- ❓ **Audit Retention:** How long to retain `role_approval_requests` history? (Assumed 7 years for compliance; confirm with legal)
- ❓ **Domain-Specific Roles:** Should QUANT_ENGINEER/RISK_MANAGER/COMPLIANCE roles be predefined, or dynamically created per organization? (Deferred to VS-03+)
-
---
-
-## ✅ Compliance & Traceability
-
-**Governance:** AGENTS.md v16.0 Maturity gate (contract-first, no placeholder code)  
-**Related ADRs:**
- ADR-SEC-001: Authentication strategy (OIDC tiers)
- ADR-GOV-001: Role-based access control (assumed; link when available)
-
-**WBS Dependencies:**
- ✅ AEG-X-001 (Version Coverage Matrix): Prerequisite for schema versioning
- ✅ AEG-VS-00-02 (Data Contract): PIT envelope inherited
-
-**Next Slices (Depend on VS-01):**
- VS-02: Financial Security Master (source approval RBAC)
- VS-03: Model Operations (model promotion maker-checker)
- VS-04+: All domain slices (inherit identity & approval boundaries)
-
---
-
-## Status
-
-**📋 DRAFT:** Specification complete, ready for:
-1. Security team approval (RBAC matrix + MFA tiers)
-2. Compliance team approval (maker-checker SLA + audit retention)
-3. Architecture review (schema + PIT readiness)
-4. Next: Implementation (separate PR for schema migration + tests)
-
@@ -1,161 +0,0 @@
-# VS-02: Financial Security Master Data Synchronization
-
-**Vertical Slice:** VS-02 (Financial Security Master)  
-**Version:** 1.0 DRAFT  
-**Date:** 2026-08-07  
-**Owner:** Data Architecture & Compliance  
-**Status:** ⚠️ DRAFT (Source Unknown — See Issues Below)
-
---
-
-## ⚠️ Critical Notice: Domain Correction
-
-**Previous Implementation (Superseded):**  
-Existing code at `src/KArtSell.Host/Features/SecurityMaster/VS02_*.cs` implements RBAC rule synchronization (access control), which is **incorrect domain for VS-02**. See **TECH-DEBT-XXX** for tech debt registration and removal plan.
-
-**Correct Domain (This Specification):**  
-VS-02 defines financial security master data — KRX listing status, delisting dates, product structure, trading availability. This is **PIT-tracked reference data**, not access control rules.
-
---
-
-## 📋 User Story
-
-**As a** risk manager / compliance officer  
-**I want to** maintain authoritative, point-in-time financial security attributes (listing status, delisting dates, product structure)  
-**So that** shadow run simulation, sell decision, and portfolio reconciliation can reference frozen, auditable security master state
-
-**Acceptance Criteria:**
- 📋 Listing status & delisting dates tracked (KRX official source)
- 📋 Product structure captured (주식/채권/파생/펀드 분류)
- 📋 Trading availability flags maintained (거래정지, 관리종목, etc.)
- 📋 PIT queries enforced (all reads include `WHERE published_at <= cutoff`)
- 📋 Data lineage & source attribution documented
-
---
-
-## 🎯 Non-Goals
-
- ❌ Implement access-control rule synchronization (belongs to VS-01 / separate auth slice)
- ❌ Build KRX API integration (deferred; CSV upload manual for v1.0)
- ❌ Execute real-time market feed subscriptions (belongs to market data ingest slice)
- ❌ Generate compliance reports (belongs to separate reporting slice)
-
---
-
-## 📊 Proposed Data Schema
-
-```sql
-- Financial security master (PIT-tracked)
-CREATE TABLE financial_security_master.securities (
-    id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
-    krx_code VARCHAR(12) NOT NULL,  -- e.g., "005930" (Samsung)
-    security_name VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
-    security_type VARCHAR(50) NOT NULL,  -- STOCK, BOND, DERIVATIVE, FUND
-    listing_date DATE,
-    delisting_date DATE,
-    is_listed BOOLEAN,
-    trading_status VARCHAR(50),  -- NORMAL, SUSPENDED, DELISTED
-    product_category VARCHAR(100),  -- 종목분류 e.g., LARGE_CAP, MID_CAP, SMALL_CAP
-    currency_code VARCHAR(3),  -- KRW, USD
-    published_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
-    revision INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
-    correlation_id UUID NOT NULL
-);
-
-CREATE TABLE financial_security_master.trading_restrictions (
-    id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
-    security_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES financial_security_master.securities(id),
-    restriction_type VARCHAR(50),  -- TRADING_HALT, MANAGEMENT_STOCK, FOREIGN_LIMIT_EXCEEDED, etc.
-    effective_date DATE NOT NULL,
-    end_date DATE,
-    reason TEXT,
-    published_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
-    revision INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
-    correlation_id UUID NOT NULL
-);
-```
-
---
-
-## ✅ Source / Assumptions / Unknown
-
-### Source
-
- **KRX Official Source:** KRX OPEN DATA (상장/상폐 공시)
- **Reference:** `CLAUDE.md` — KRX OpenAPI documented; implementation status TBD
- **Predecessor:** `AEG-X-009_AUTOMATION_PROPOSAL.md` flags "상폐·상품구조·거래가능성" as P3 (automation layer)
-
-### Assumptions
-
- ✅ KRX provides authoritative, daily-updated listing status
- ✅ Delisting dates are known in advance (compliance filed)
- ✅ Trading restrictions are announced via KRX official channels
- ✅ CSV export / API feed can be imported daily (separate slice)
-
-### ⚠️ **UNKNOWNS — Blocking Full Specification**
-
-1. **Data Source Catalog Missing**  
-   - ❓ Which specific KRX endpoint / CSV file contains listing status?  
-   - ❓ Is there a 3rd-party data aggregator (Bloomberg, FactSet)?  
-   - ❓ Is CSV manual upload acceptable for v1.0, or must we have automated ingest?  
-   - **Status:** Not found in `source-catalog.md` — requires data governance review
-
-2. **Refresh Frequency & SLA**  
-   - ❓ Daily update sufficient, or intraday?  
-   - ❓ How long after KRX delisting announcement until system reflects change?  
-   - **Status:** No SLA documented in CLAUDE.md
-
-3. **Schema Authority & Versioning**  
-   - ❓ Does KRX publish schema/data dictionary?  
-   - ❓ If schema changes (new trading restriction type), how do we version?  
-   - **Status:** Deferred to data contract review
-
-4. **Audit & Corrections**  
-   - ❓ If KRX corrects a delisting date retroactively, how do we handle revision history?  
-   - ❓ Do we notify downstream (shadow runs, sell decisions) of corrections?  
-   - **Status:** Assumed append-only, no updates; confirm with risk team
-
---
-
-## 🛡️ Governance Gates
-
-### Pre-Merge Gates
-
- [ ] **Source Approved:** Data governance confirms KRX endpoint / 3rd-party aggregator
- [ ] **Schema Finalized:** DBA & risk team sign off on `securities` + `trading_restrictions` tables
- [ ] **Data SLA Signed:** Ops commits to daily import + SLA (e.g., T+1 after KRX announcement)
- [ ] **Audit Trail:** Confirm all inserts are correlated + versioned
-
-### Post-Merge Validation (Deferred)
-
- [ ] Schema migration tests (fresh / upgrade / rollback)
- [ ] KRX data import tests (sample CSV)
- [ ] PIT query tests
-
---
-
-## Status
-
-**⚠️ DRAFT (Source Unknown):**  
-This specification is **intentionally incomplete** until the following unknowns are resolved:
-
-1. **KRX Data Source:** Confirm endpoint / feed URI in source-catalog.md
-2. **Import SLA:** Confirm daily update frequency & latency tolerance
-3. **Audit & Corrections:** Confirm handling of retroactive corrections
-
-**Do NOT implement schema or import logic until above are approved.**
-
-**Next Steps:**
-1. Data governance team reviews & approves Source Unknown items
-2. Separate PR adds schema migration (after source approval)
-3. Separate PR adds import job (after SLA & audit approval)
-
---
-
-## Related Documents
-
- **Governance:** AGENTS.md v16.0, CLAUDE.md "No real customer data seeded"
- **Tech Debt:** TECH-DEBT-XXX (VS-02 mislabeled code, awaiting removal decision)
- **Upstream:** VS-00 (PIT envelope), VS-01 (approval boundaries)
- **Downstream:** VS-03 (model operations), AEG-X-009 (automation orchestration)
-
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ public sealed record ModelOperationRequest(
 public interface IApprovedModelContextReader
 {
    Task<ApprovedModelContext?> ReadAsync(string scopeKey, DateTimeOffset asOf, CancellationToken cancellationToken);
+    Task<ApprovedModelContext?> ReadAsync(Guid modelId, string scopeKey, DateTimeOffset asOf, CancellationToken cancellationToken);
 }

 public interface IModelScheduleRepository
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ namespace KArtSell.Modules.ModelOperations.Infrastructure;

 public sealed class DapperApprovedModelContextReader(IDbConnectionFactory connectionFactory) : IApprovedModelContextReader
 {
-    private const string Sql = """
+    private const string SqlByScope = """
        select mv.scope_key as ScopeKey,
               mv.model_version as ModelVersion,
               mv.config_version as ConfigVersion,
@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@ public sealed class DapperApprovedModelContextReader(IDbConnectionFactory connec
        limit 1;
        """;

+    private static readonly string SqlByModel = SqlByScope.Replace(
+        "where mv.scope_key = @ScopeKey",
+        "where mv.model_id = @ModelId and mv.scope_key = @ScopeKey");
+
    public async Task<ApprovedModelContext?> ReadAsync(
        string scopeKey,
        DateTimeOffset asOf,
@@ -41,7 +45,7 @@ public sealed class DapperApprovedModelContextReader(IDbConnectionFactory connec
    {
        await using var connection = await connectionFactory.OpenAsync(cancellationToken);
        var row = await connection.QuerySingleOrDefaultAsync<Row>(new CommandDefinition(
-            Sql,
+            SqlByScope,
            new { ScopeKey = scopeKey, AsOf = asOf },
            cancellationToken: cancellationToken));

@@ -55,6 +59,27 @@ public sealed class DapperApprovedModelContextReader(IDbConnectionFactory connec
            row.EffectiveAt);
    }

+    public async Task<ApprovedModelContext?> ReadAsync(
+        Guid modelId,
+        string scopeKey,
+        DateTimeOffset asOf,
+        CancellationToken cancellationToken)
+    {
+        await using var connection = await connectionFactory.OpenAsync(cancellationToken);
+        var row = await connection.QuerySingleOrDefaultAsync<Row>(new CommandDefinition(
+            SqlByModel,
+            new { ModelId = modelId, ScopeKey = scopeKey, AsOf = asOf },
+            cancellationToken: cancellationToken));
+
+        return row is null ? null : ToContext(row);
+    }
+
+    private static ApprovedModelContext ToContext(Row row) => new(
+        row.ScopeKey,
+        new VersionSet(row.DatasetId, row.DataHash, row.ModelVersion, row.ConfigVersion, row.CodeSha, row.ContractVersion),
+        row.LifecycleState,
+        row.EffectiveAt);
+
    private sealed record Row(
        string ScopeKey,
        string DatasetId,