diff --git a/TECH_DEBT_REGISTER.md b/TECH_DEBT_REGISTER.md
index e5232545..bcc4c247 100644
--- a/TECH_DEBT_REGISTER.md
+++ b/TECH_DEBT_REGISTER.md
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
 |----|----------|--------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-----|
 | DEBT-007 | Newtonsoft.Json override | Medium (2) | Medium (2) | Completed | Fixed in 88ea5ed: CA1848/CA1859 actual implementation. LoggerMessage + HashSet/Dictionary. | @claude | - |
 | DEBT-008 | Namespace consistency | Medium (2) | Low (1) | Accepted | All projects use RootNamespace=KArtSell.Aegis; AssemblyName retained per-project for DLL clarity. Trade-off accepted: DLL clarity > namespace alignment. No action. | @claude | PR 4d |
+| DEBT-016 | VS-02 mislabeled domain | Medium (2) | Low (1) | Backlog | Existing code `VS02_SyncSecurityMasterEndpoint.cs`, `VS02_SecurityMasterJobs.cs`, `VS02_SecurityMasterPolicy.cs` implement RBAC rule synchronization (access control), not financial security master data (listing/delisting/product structure). Dead code: endpoints disabled (DISABLED comment), schema `security_master.rules` table never migrated, never deployed. Correct domain documented in `docs/CURRENT/SLICE_SPECS/VS-02-SLICE_SPEC.md` (financial PIT). Removal decision deferred pending architect review (PR recommended). | @claude | docs/CURRENT/SLICE_SPECS/VS-02-SLICE_SPEC.md |
 
 ---
 
diff --git a/docs/CURRENT/CATALOGS/WBS_PROGRESS_TRACKER.csv b/docs/CURRENT/CATALOGS/WBS_PROGRESS_TRACKER.csv
index 0aaa5504..e5c3c17d 100644
--- a/docs/CURRENT/CATALOGS/WBS_PROGRESS_TRACKER.csv
+++ b/docs/CURRENT/CATALOGS/WBS_PROGRESS_TRACKER.csv
@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ AEG-VS-00-05,S0,VS-00,Event/Job/Inbox·재처리 구현,COMPLETED,2026-08-04,"do
 AEG-VS-00-06,S0,VS-00,Vue feature·Zod·Query·컴포넌트 구현,COMPLETED,2026-08-04,"docs/CURRENT/ARTIFACTS/AEG-VS-00-06_ACCEPTANCE_EVIDENCE.md + frontend/src/features/shadow-run/",FE Lead,"✅ Vue 3 feature module complete: ShadowRunPage + ShadowRunForm + Results + Chart, Pinia store, TanStack Query, Zod validation, vee-validate, 40/40 component tests PASS. Acceptance_Evidence: All criteria verified (accessibility, responsive, state ownership, error handling)."
 AEG-VS-00-07,S0,VS-00,회귀·관제·Runbook·Rollback 증거,COMPLETED,2026-08-04,docs/operational-runbook.md + PRODUCTION_READINESS.md + scripts/*.ps1 + commit ca2aeae,QA/SRE,"Golden/integration/failure/replay/E2E + metric/alert/Owner/Secondary/rollback rehearsal complete (Acceptance_Evidence: '회귀·관제·Runbook·Rollback 증거') - 7 scenarios, 4 scripts, 18 queries verified"
 AEG-X-009,S1,Cross,Source catalog 고도화,PLANNED,-,-,Data Governance,"Deferred to Phase 2 (after Gate 1 completion)"
-AEG-VS-01-01,S1,VS-01,정책·범위·실패상태 계약 확정,PLANNED,-,-,PM/Architect,"Blocked: Depends on AEG-X-001. Future sprint."
-AEG-VS-02-01,S1,VS-02,정책·범위·실패상태 계약 확정,PLANNED,-,-,PM/Architect,"Blocked: Depends on AEG-VS-00-02. Future sprint."
+AEG-VS-01-01,S1,VS-01,정책·범위·실패상태 계약 확정,IN_PROGRESS,2026-08-07,docs/CURRENT/SLICE_SPECS/VS-01-SLICE_SPEC.md,PM/Architect,"✅ SLICE_SPEC produced: VS-01-SLICE_SPEC.md (identity/MFA/RBAC/maker-checker contract). Prerequisite AEG-X-001 + AEG-VS-00-02 already COMPLETED. Ready for security team review and schema implementation."
+AEG-VS-02-01,S1,VS-02,정책·범위·실패상태 계약 확정,DRAFT,2026-08-07,docs/CURRENT/SLICE_SPECS/VS-02-SLICE_SPEC.md,PM/Architect,"⚠️ DRAFT (Source Unknown): Existing VS-02 code implements RBAC rule sync (wrong domain), registered as DEBT-016. Correct domain (financial security master: listing/delisting/product structure) documented in VS-02-SLICE_SPEC.md stub with Source/Assumption/Unknown. Blockers: (1) KRX data source not in source-catalog.md, (2) import SLA not confirmed, (3) audit/correction policy undefined. Awaiting data governance approval of unknowns before schema implementation."
 AEG-VS-03-01,S2,VS-03,정책·범위·실패상태 계약 확정,PLANNED,-,-,PM/Architect,"Blocked: Depends on AEG-VS-02-01. Future sprint."
 AEG-VS-04-01,S2,VS-04,정책·범위·실패상태 계약 확정,PLANNED,-,-,PM/Architect,"Blocked: Depends on AEG-VS-03-01. Future sprint."
 AEG-VS-05-01,S3,VS-05,정책·범위·실패상태 계약 확정,PLANNED,-,-,PM/Architect,"Blocked: Depends on Gate 1 (Phase 1). Waiting for Job 976 (~50-90 days)."
diff --git a/docs/CURRENT/SLICE_SPECS/VS-01-SLICE_SPEC.md b/docs/CURRENT/SLICE_SPECS/VS-01-SLICE_SPEC.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..03f13d69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/CURRENT/SLICE_SPECS/VS-01-SLICE_SPEC.md
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+# VS-01: Identity Access Control (IAC) & Role-Based Access
+
+**Vertical Slice:** VS-01 (Identity & Authorization)  
+**Version:** 1.0 DRAFT  
+**Date:** 2026-08-07  
+**Owner:** Security & Identity Architecture  
+**Status:** 📋 DRAFT (Specification Ready for Contract Review)
+
+---
+
+## 📋 User Story
+
+**As a** platform security architect  
+**I want to** establish identity, MFA, RBAC role hierarchy, and maker-checker approval boundaries  
+**So that** all downstream slices (VS-02 through VS-08) can enforce consistent access control and segregation of duties
+
+**Acceptance Criteria:**
+- 📋 Identity contract defined (user/role/permission schema)
+- 📋 MFA policy specified (2FA/TOTP/WebAuthn tiers)
+- 📋 RBAC role hierarchy formalized (Guest/User/Operator/Admin/SuperAdmin + domain-specific roles)
+- 📋 Maker-checker approval boundaries documented (for critical operations like model promotion, dataset freeze)
+- 📋 Permission matrix mapped (read/write/delete/audit per role)
+
+---
+
+## 🎯 Non-Goals
+
+- ❌ Implement UI/API endpoints (belongs to BE/FE slices)
+- ❌ Integrate with external identity provider (OIDC/Kerberos setup deferred)
+- ❌ Build MFA enforcement engine (belongs to separate AUTH_ENFORCEMENT slice)
+- ❌ Execute permission checks (belongs to handler/middleware slices)
+- ❌ Seed production user data (deferred to operations)
+
+---
+
+## 🔄 State Transitions
+
+### Identity Lifecycle
+
+```
+[UNDEFINED]
+    ↓ (user registered)
+[ACTIVE]
+    ↓ (MFA required but not set)
+[REQUIRES_MFA_SETUP]
+    ↓ (MFA device registered)
+[MFA_CONFIGURED]
+    ↓ (temporary disable during password reset)
+[MFA_SUSPENDED]
+    ↓ (re-enable)
+[MFA_CONFIGURED]
+    ↓ (admin deactivation)
+[INACTIVE]
+    ↓ (security breach)
+[REVOKED]
+```
+
+### Role Assignment Workflow (Maker-Checker)
+
+```
+User requests elevated role (e.g., OPERATOR → ADMIN)
+    ↓
+[PENDING_APPROVAL] ← Role request created (requester_id, requested_role, reason)
+    ↓
+Admin receives notification (role.required_approver_count = 2)
+    ↓
+Approver-1 reviews & approves/rejects
+    ↓
+[APPROVED_BY_1] or [REJECTED]
+    ↓ (if approved by 1, awaits Approver-2)
+[APPROVED_BY_2]
+    ↓
+[ACTIVE] (role_assignment.effective_at set, correlation_id = approval_request.id)
+    ↓
+[EXPIRED] (optional: time-bound roles like "Quarterly Reviewer")
+```
+
+---
+
+## 🔐 RBAC Constraints
+
+### Core Role Hierarchy
+
+| Role | Description | Can Access | Can Modify | Can Approve | Maker-Checker Approval Required |
+|------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|--------|
+| **GUEST** | Anonymous/public | Public resources (GDP compliant) | ❌ | ❌ | N/A |
+| **USER** | Authenticated individual | Own data + shared workspace | Own data | ❌ | N/A |
+| **OPERATOR** | Operations team (data ops, risk team) | All non-sensitive data | Configurations | MODEL_ACTIVATION (1 more) | MODEL_ACTIVATION, DATASET_FREEZE |
+| **ADMIN** | Platform administrator | All data (except audit logs) | All (soft delete) | All (except critical) | CRITICAL_CONFIG, USER_REVOCATION |
+| **SUPER_ADMIN** | Super administrator | All (including audit logs) | All (hard delete) | All | N/A (can self-approve in emergency) |
+
+### Domain-Specific Roles (Optional, for Future Slices)
+
+- **QUANT_ENGINEER** — Can read market data, backtest code; cannot modify live models
+- **RISK_MANAGER** — Can read risk dashboards, flag models; cannot freeze or promote
+- **COMPLIANCE_OFFICER** — Can audit all; cannot modify data
+- **MODEL_REVIEWER** — Can read model cards, evidence; approves promotion via maker-checker
+
+### MFA Tiers
+
+| Tier | Requirement | Impact | Users |
+|------|-------------|--------|-------|
+| **NO_MFA** | None (legacy) | Guest/public read | Public API consumers |
+| **TOTP_OPTIONAL** | Google Authenticator / Authy (optional) | USER tier | General staff |
+| **TOTP_REQUIRED** | TOTP mandatory | OPERATOR+ tier | Operations, Risk, Compliance |
+| **HARDWARE_KEY** | YubiKey / FIDO2 (required) | SUPER_ADMIN tier | Executives, DBAs |
+
+---
+
+## 📊 Data Contract (v1.0)
+
+### Point-in-Time (PIT) Envelope (Inherited from VS-00)
+
+All identity tables MUST include:
+
+```sql
+-- Core identity tables
+CREATE TABLE identity.users (
+    id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
+    email VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+    display_name VARCHAR(255),
+    mfa_status VARCHAR(50) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'REQUIRES_MFA_SETUP',  -- ACTIVE, REQUIRES_MFA_SETUP, MFA_CONFIGURED, INACTIVE, REVOKED
+    mfa_method VARCHAR(50),  -- TOTP, HARDWARE_KEY, none
+    created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
+    updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
+    published_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
+    revision INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
+    correlation_id UUID NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE identity.roles (
+    id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
+    name VARCHAR(100) NOT NULL UNIQUE,  -- GUEST, USER, OPERATOR, ADMIN, SUPER_ADMIN
+    description TEXT,
+    required_approver_count INT DEFAULT 1,  -- How many approvers needed for elevation to this role
+    published_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
+    revision INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
+    correlation_id UUID NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE identity.user_roles (
+    id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
+    user_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES identity.users(id),
+    role_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES identity.roles(id),
+    assigned_by_user_id UUID,  -- Who assigned this role
+    effective_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
+    expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ,  -- Optional: time-bound roles
+    is_active BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
+    published_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
+    revision INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
+    correlation_id UUID NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE identity.role_approval_requests (
+    id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
+    user_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES identity.users(id),
+    requested_role_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES identity.roles(id),
+    reason TEXT,
+    status VARCHAR(50) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'PENDING_APPROVAL',  -- PENDING_APPROVAL, APPROVED_BY_1, APPROVED_BY_2, REJECTED, WITHDRAWN
+    approver_count_required INT NOT NULL,
+    approvers JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '[]'::JSONB,  -- [{ "approver_id": UUID, "approved_at": TIMESTAMPTZ, "reason": "" }]
+    created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
+    published_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
+    revision INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
+    correlation_id UUID NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE identity.mfa_devices (
+    id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
+    user_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES identity.users(id),
+    device_type VARCHAR(50) NOT NULL,  -- TOTP, HARDWARE_KEY
+    secret_hash VARCHAR(255),  -- Hashed TOTP secret (never store plaintext)
+    device_name VARCHAR(255),  -- User-friendly name ("My YubiKey", "Work Phone")
+    registered_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
+    last_used_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
+    is_backup_device BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
+    published_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
+    revision INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
+    correlation_id UUID NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE identity.permissions (
+    id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
+    role_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES identity.roles(id),
+    resource VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,  -- "model_activation", "dataset_freeze", "user_management"
+    action VARCHAR(50) NOT NULL,  -- READ, WRITE, DELETE, AUDIT
+    constraints JSONB,  -- Optional: { "requires_approval_count": 2, "requires_evidence": ["model_card"] }
+    published_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
+    revision INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
+    correlation_id UUID NOT NULL,
+    UNIQUE(role_id, resource, action)
+);
+```
+
+### Data Quality Rules
+
+- ✅ No direct password storage (use bcrypt + salt)
+- ✅ MFA secrets never logged or exposed in HTTP responses
+- ✅ All role changes tracked in `user_roles` append-only (no soft deletes)
+- ✅ Approval requests immutable once APPROVED_BY_1 or REJECTED
+- ✅ PIT envelope strictly enforced: `published_at <= cutoff` for all reads
+- ✅ `correlation_id` links all related tables for audit trail
+
+---
+
+## 🛡️ Governance Gates
+
+### Pre-Merge Gates
+
+- [ ] **RBAC Matrix Approved:** Security team signs off on role hierarchy and permission matrix
+- [ ] **MFA Tier Mapping:** Confirm mapping between role tiers and MFA requirements
+- [ ] **Maker-Checker Thresholds:** Define approval_count per critical operation (e.g., model promotion = 2 approvers)
+- [ ] **Audit Log Design:** Confirm all authorization decisions (grant/deny/revoke) are logged with `correlation_id`
+- [ ] **Identity Provider Integration Plan:** Document OIDC/Kerberos provider (if applicable)
+
+### Post-Merge Validation
+
+- [ ] **Schema Tests:** User/role/MFA creation tests pass (40+ scenarios)
+- [ ] **RBAC Policy Tests:** Permission matrix matches code (cross-checked vs ADR-SEC-001)
+- [ ] **PIT Query Tests:** All reads include `WHERE published_at <= @cutoff`
+
+---
+
+## 📋 Source / Assumptions / Unknown
+
+### Source
+
+- **ADR-SEC-001:** OIDC/JWT/DevelopmentHeader authentication tiers (approved 2026-08-04)
+- **Existing RBAC:** VS-00-SLICE_SPEC (base governance, roles table exists)
+- **Maker-Checker Pattern:** Standard 2-approver workflow from compliance requirements
+
+### Assumptions
+
+- ✅ OIDC identity provider will be integrated later (separate slice); VS-01 is schema + policy only
+- ✅ MFA enforcement (checking device before operation) happens in middleware/handler layer (not here)
+- ✅ Audit logging of permission checks is already handled by OutboxPollerJob + SerilogCorrelation
+- ✅ All users are human; no service-account roles yet (may expand in future)
+
+### Unknown
+
+- ❓ **OIDC Provider Identity:** Which OIDC provider (Keycloak, Auth0, Azure AD)? Deferred to separate architecture decision.
+- ❓ **Hardware Key Vendor:** YubiKey vs other FIDO2 vendors? Deferred to procurement.
+- ❓ **Approval SLA:** How long can role requests stay in PENDING_APPROVAL before escalation alert? (Assumed 5 business days; confirm with ops)
+- ❓ **Audit Retention:** How long to retain `role_approval_requests` history? (Assumed 7 years for compliance; confirm with legal)
+- ❓ **Domain-Specific Roles:** Should QUANT_ENGINEER/RISK_MANAGER/COMPLIANCE roles be predefined, or dynamically created per organization? (Deferred to VS-03+)
+
+---
+
+## ✅ Compliance & Traceability
+
+**Governance:** AGENTS.md v16.0 Maturity gate (contract-first, no placeholder code)  
+**Related ADRs:**
+- ADR-SEC-001: Authentication strategy (OIDC tiers)
+- ADR-GOV-001: Role-based access control (assumed; link when available)
+
+**WBS Dependencies:**
+- ✅ AEG-X-001 (Version Coverage Matrix): Prerequisite for schema versioning
+- ✅ AEG-VS-00-02 (Data Contract): PIT envelope inherited
+
+**Next Slices (Depend on VS-01):**
+- VS-02: Financial Security Master (source approval RBAC)
+- VS-03: Model Operations (model promotion maker-checker)
+- VS-04+: All domain slices (inherit identity & approval boundaries)
+
+---
+
+## Status
+
+**📋 DRAFT:** Specification complete, ready for:
+1. Security team approval (RBAC matrix + MFA tiers)
+2. Compliance team approval (maker-checker SLA + audit retention)
+3. Architecture review (schema + PIT readiness)
+4. Next: Implementation (separate PR for schema migration + tests)
+
diff --git a/docs/CURRENT/SLICE_SPECS/VS-02-SLICE_SPEC.md b/docs/CURRENT/SLICE_SPECS/VS-02-SLICE_SPEC.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e77560a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/CURRENT/SLICE_SPECS/VS-02-SLICE_SPEC.md
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+# VS-02: Financial Security Master Data Synchronization
+
+**Vertical Slice:** VS-02 (Financial Security Master)  
+**Version:** 1.0 DRAFT  
+**Date:** 2026-08-07  
+**Owner:** Data Architecture & Compliance  
+**Status:** ⚠️ DRAFT (Source Unknown — See Issues Below)
+
+---
+
+## ⚠️ Critical Notice: Domain Correction
+
+**Previous Implementation (Superseded):**  
+Existing code at `src/KArtSell.Host/Features/SecurityMaster/VS02_*.cs` implements RBAC rule synchronization (access control), which is **incorrect domain for VS-02**. See **TECH-DEBT-XXX** for tech debt registration and removal plan.
+
+**Correct Domain (This Specification):**  
+VS-02 defines financial security master data — KRX listing status, delisting dates, product structure, trading availability. This is **PIT-tracked reference data**, not access control rules.
+
+---
+
+## 📋 User Story
+
+**As a** risk manager / compliance officer  
+**I want to** maintain authoritative, point-in-time financial security attributes (listing status, delisting dates, product structure)  
+**So that** shadow run simulation, sell decision, and portfolio reconciliation can reference frozen, auditable security master state
+
+**Acceptance Criteria:**
+- 📋 Listing status & delisting dates tracked (KRX official source)
+- 📋 Product structure captured (주식/채권/파생/펀드 분류)
+- 📋 Trading availability flags maintained (거래정지, 관리종목, etc.)
+- 📋 PIT queries enforced (all reads include `WHERE published_at <= cutoff`)
+- 📋 Data lineage & source attribution documented
+
+---
+
+## 🎯 Non-Goals
+
+- ❌ Implement access-control rule synchronization (belongs to VS-01 / separate auth slice)
+- ❌ Build KRX API integration (deferred; CSV upload manual for v1.0)
+- ❌ Execute real-time market feed subscriptions (belongs to market data ingest slice)
+- ❌ Generate compliance reports (belongs to separate reporting slice)
+
+---
+
+## 📊 Proposed Data Schema
+
+```sql
+-- Financial security master (PIT-tracked)
+CREATE TABLE financial_security_master.securities (
+    id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
+    krx_code VARCHAR(12) NOT NULL,  -- e.g., "005930" (Samsung)
+    security_name VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
+    security_type VARCHAR(50) NOT NULL,  -- STOCK, BOND, DERIVATIVE, FUND
+    listing_date DATE,
+    delisting_date DATE,
+    is_listed BOOLEAN,
+    trading_status VARCHAR(50),  -- NORMAL, SUSPENDED, DELISTED
+    product_category VARCHAR(100),  -- 종목분류 e.g., LARGE_CAP, MID_CAP, SMALL_CAP
+    currency_code VARCHAR(3),  -- KRW, USD
+    published_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
+    revision INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
+    correlation_id UUID NOT NULL
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE financial_security_master.trading_restrictions (
+    id UUID PRIMARY KEY,
+    security_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES financial_security_master.securities(id),
+    restriction_type VARCHAR(50),  -- TRADING_HALT, MANAGEMENT_STOCK, FOREIGN_LIMIT_EXCEEDED, etc.
+    effective_date DATE NOT NULL,
+    end_date DATE,
+    reason TEXT,
+    published_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
+    revision INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
+    correlation_id UUID NOT NULL
+);
+```
+
+---
+
+## ✅ Source / Assumptions / Unknown
+
+### Source
+
+- **KRX Official Source:** KRX OPEN DATA (상장/상폐 공시)
+- **Reference:** `CLAUDE.md` — KRX OpenAPI documented; implementation status TBD
+- **Predecessor:** `AEG-X-009_AUTOMATION_PROPOSAL.md` flags "상폐·상품구조·거래가능성" as P3 (automation layer)
+
+### Assumptions
+
+- ✅ KRX provides authoritative, daily-updated listing status
+- ✅ Delisting dates are known in advance (compliance filed)
+- ✅ Trading restrictions are announced via KRX official channels
+- ✅ CSV export / API feed can be imported daily (separate slice)
+
+### ⚠️ **UNKNOWNS — Blocking Full Specification**
+
+1. **Data Source Catalog Missing**  
+   - ❓ Which specific KRX endpoint / CSV file contains listing status?  
+   - ❓ Is there a 3rd-party data aggregator (Bloomberg, FactSet)?  
+   - ❓ Is CSV manual upload acceptable for v1.0, or must we have automated ingest?  
+   - **Status:** Not found in `source-catalog.md` — requires data governance review
+
+2. **Refresh Frequency & SLA**  
+   - ❓ Daily update sufficient, or intraday?  
+   - ❓ How long after KRX delisting announcement until system reflects change?  
+   - **Status:** No SLA documented in CLAUDE.md
+
+3. **Schema Authority & Versioning**  
+   - ❓ Does KRX publish schema/data dictionary?  
+   - ❓ If schema changes (new trading restriction type), how do we version?  
+   - **Status:** Deferred to data contract review
+
+4. **Audit & Corrections**  
+   - ❓ If KRX corrects a delisting date retroactively, how do we handle revision history?  
+   - ❓ Do we notify downstream (shadow runs, sell decisions) of corrections?  
+   - **Status:** Assumed append-only, no updates; confirm with risk team
+
+---
+
+## 🛡️ Governance Gates
+
+### Pre-Merge Gates
+
+- [ ] **Source Approved:** Data governance confirms KRX endpoint / 3rd-party aggregator
+- [ ] **Schema Finalized:** DBA & risk team sign off on `securities` + `trading_restrictions` tables
+- [ ] **Data SLA Signed:** Ops commits to daily import + SLA (e.g., T+1 after KRX announcement)
+- [ ] **Audit Trail:** Confirm all inserts are correlated + versioned
+
+### Post-Merge Validation (Deferred)
+
+- [ ] Schema migration tests (fresh / upgrade / rollback)
+- [ ] KRX data import tests (sample CSV)
+- [ ] PIT query tests
+
+---
+
+## Status
+
+**⚠️ DRAFT (Source Unknown):**  
+This specification is **intentionally incomplete** until the following unknowns are resolved:
+
+1. **KRX Data Source:** Confirm endpoint / feed URI in source-catalog.md
+2. **Import SLA:** Confirm daily update frequency & latency tolerance
+3. **Audit & Corrections:** Confirm handling of retroactive corrections
+
+**Do NOT implement schema or import logic until above are approved.**
+
+**Next Steps:**
+1. Data governance team reviews & approves Source Unknown items
+2. Separate PR adds schema migration (after source approval)
+3. Separate PR adds import job (after SLA & audit approval)
+
+---
+
+## Related Documents
+
+- **Governance:** AGENTS.md v16.0, CLAUDE.md "No real customer data seeded"
+- **Tech Debt:** TECH-DEBT-XXX (VS-02 mislabeled code, awaiting removal decision)
+- **Upstream:** VS-00 (PIT envelope), VS-01 (approval boundaries)
+- **Downstream:** VS-03 (model operations), AEG-X-009 (automation orchestration)
+